The AGM recovery postulate says: assume a set of propositions X; assume that it is consistent and that it is closed under logical consequences; remove a belief P from the set minimally, but make sure that the resultant set is again some set of propositions X ′ which is closed under the logical consequences; now add P again and close the set under the logical consequences; and we should get a set of propositions that contains all the propositions that were in X. This postulate has since met objections; many have observed that it could bear counter-intuitive results. Nevertheless, the attempts that have been made so far to amend it either recovered the postulate in full, had to relinquish the assumption of the logical closure altogether, or else had to introduce fresh controversies of their own. We provide a solution to the recovery paradox in this work. Our theoretical basis is the recently proposed belief theory with latent beliefs (simply the latent belief theory for short). Firstly, through an example, we will illustrate that there are still rooms for improvement in the latent belief theory in order to naturally model certain scenarios. We will identify that a latent belief, when it becomes visible, may remain visible only while the beliefs that triggered it into the agent's consciousness are in the agent's belief set. In order that such situations can be also handled, we will enrich the latent belief theory with belief dependencies among attributive beliefs, recording the information as to which belief is supported of its existence by which beliefs. We will show that the enriched latent belief theory does not possess the recovery property. The closure by logical consequences is maintained in the theory, however. Hence it serves as a solution to the open problem in the belief set theories.
Introduction
The belief theory with latent beliefs, the latent belief theory for short, was recently proposed [2] . In the framework, every evidence {P } ⋄ is a collection of propositions, consisting of one primary proposition P and zero or more attributive propositions expressed in triples: P (P 1 , P 2 ) for some P 1 and P 2 . Each P (P 1 , P 2 ) is basically P 2 in any environment that contains P 1 ; otherwise, it is a latent belief not presently visible, despite its existence, within the environment. What we have called an environment is, in the particular setting of the belief theory, a set of propositions and triples associated to them. Since they characterise the beliefs held by a rational agent, an environment is representative of the state of the mind of a rational agent's, which we may then just call a belief set, as in the AGM belief theory [1] . A logical closure property holds in the latent belief theory: if P 1 , . . . , P n are in a belief set, then any proposition that is a logical consequence of any one or any ones in conjunction of them is also in the belief set. But because the belief sets in the latent belief theory could also contain those triples, they hold more information in general than a belief set in a traditional belief set theory does. To illustrate the point of the triples, suppose that {P } ⋄ consists of P, P (P 1 , P 2 ) and P (P 3 , P 4 ). Suppose that an agent believes P 1 , i.e. his/her belief set contains P 1 . Then P (P 1 , P 2 ) is basically P 2 to the agent; and P 2 is in the belief set. But suppose that it does not contain P 3 ; then it is not necessarily the case that P 4 is in the set. Suppose that P 4 is not in the set, then {P, P 2 } will be the agent's perception of {P } ⋄ . Nonetheless, if P 3 is added to the set, then the agent's perception of {P } ⋄ will be {P, P 2 , P 4 }. As this example illustrates, the latent belief theory captures the dynamic nature of a belief/knowledge within the mind of a rational agent's. Some constituents of {P } ⋄ are visible, some others may be latent, depending on what beliefs are visible to his/her conscious mind.
Let us contemplate upon the triples. In [2] , a latent belief, once it becomes visible to an agent, will acquire the equal significance in footing to any other visible beliefs that he/she holds. In particular, if P (P 1 , P 2 ) is latent to him/her, and if P 2 becomes visible, then contraction of his/her belief set by P does not necessarily entail the loss of P 2 . There are many scenarios that justify the particular behaviour. Consider the following propositions.
Suppose the following structure for {P 1 } ⋄ : {P 1 } ⋄ = ({P 1 }, {P 1 (P 2 , P 3 )}), having the primary proposition P 1 as well as one attributive proposition P 1 (P 2 , P 3 ). It is not the case that P 1 implies P 2 or P 3 . Neither is it the case P 2 or P 3 P 1 . Now, suppose an agent who, among all the other propositions, believes P 1 , but does not believe either of P 2 and P 3 . That is, suppose that his/her perception of {P 1 } ⋄ is {P 1 }. When he/she learns P 2 , then P 3 is triggered into his/her mind. His/her perception of {P 1 } ⋄ is now {P 1 , P 3 }. Let us say that his/her belief set is then contracted by P 1 . But there is no reason that P 3 must be also dropped off, even though it was attributive to P 1 when it was latent. He/she does not believe {P 1 } ⋄ any more; but he/she will still believe P 3 , (or {P 3 } ⋄ which includes P 3 ). Suppose that
The need for tracking belief dependencies among attributive beliefs
. Suppose some rational agent who knows about the basic AGM postulates but who does not know about the supplementary postulates. Suppose that the agent perceives {P 1 } for {P 1 } ⋄ . From some psychology magazine, he/she perceives {P 2 } ⋄ . Let us say for simplicity that {P 2 } ⋄ = ({P 2 }, ∅). Upon his/her accepting it, P 3 , a part of {P 1 } ⋄ hitherto unknown to him/her, comes into his/her consciousness. But in no time, some external source convinces him/her that the decision on what beliefs remain and what beliefs get removed after a minimal belief contraction is as unpredictable as throwing a die. So he/she drops P 2 . In no time, his/her apprehension grows, and he/she becomes dismissive of logically representing belief changes. The proposition P 1 must go. But so must P 3 , since it has existed on the presumption that it be possible to characterise belief changes in logic, that is, in the AGM theory as he/she perceives it.
Outlines; on the side theme concerning the recovery property; and other remarks
To bring the extra expressiveness that differentiates the two cases into the latent belief theory, in Section 2 we enrich the theory by defining belief dependencies among attributive beliefs. The basic idea is to extend the definition of an attributive belief to include the fourth parameter: P (P 1 , P 2 , n) so that n can determine what beliefs P 2 will depend on once it becomes visible. As P 2 is made to exist by P and P 1 , the number of the possibilities is four, and it suffices if n ranges over {0, 1, 2, 3}. Now, once P 2 becomes visible from P (P 1 , P 2 , n), we can say that if n = 0, then P 2 is an autonomous belief, independent of P 1 and of P 2 ; if n = 1, then it is a dependent belief, independent of P 2 but dependent on P 1 ; if n = 2, then it is a dependent belief, independent of P 1 but dependent on P 2 ; and if n = 3, then it exists on the existences of both P 1 and P 2 . We store the information of which belief is dependent on what beliefs in a table comprising pairs of a proposition P and a set of propositions Γ on which P is dependent. For instance, it may contain (P, {P 1 }). Suppose that a belief set contains P, P 1 among all the other beliefs, and that it has this table. Then, if the belief set is contracted such that P 1 no longer remains in the resulting belief set, then it must also happen that the set do not contain P which -so does the table say -cannot exist unless P 1 is visible. Whenever a set of new propositions are added to or removed from a belief set, the change is reflected upon the table whose contents are updated appropriately through a set of update postulates.
In Section 3, we present all the belief change postulates, to complete the development of the enriched latent belief theory. We then show that there is no recovery property in our theory. As a brief reminder, the (AGM) recovery postulate says: assume a set of propositions X; assume that it is consistent and that it is closed under logical consequences; remove a belief P from the set minimally, but make sure that the resultant set is again some set of propositions X ′ which is closed under the logical consequences; now add P again and close the set under the logical consequences; and we should get a logically closed set of propositions that contains all the propositions that were in X. This postulate has since met objections, many researchers observing that it could bear counter-intuitive results. However, the attempts that have been made so far to amend it either recovered the postulate in full, or else had to introduce fresh controversies of their own [7] . Our theory offers the sought-after solution to the recovery paradox. Section 4 concludes.
Formalisation of dependencies among attributive beliefs and of belief sets
Readers may benefit from reading the first few sections of [2] . Although this section is technically self-contained, a detailed intuition is not given to each definition due to space limitation, which is, however, found in the reference. For the intuition of the key new notations as well as examples that illustrate why they are introduced, readers may find it useful to refer back to Section 1. Let us assume a set of possibly uncountably many atomic propositions. We denote the set by P, and refer to each element by p with or without a subscript. More general propositions are constructed from P and the logical connectives of propositional classical logic:
The subscripts denote the arity. Although the classical implication ⊃ 2 is not used explicitly, it is derivable from ¬ and ∨ in the usual manner: p 1 ⊃ p 2 ≡ ¬p 1 ∨ p 2 . The set of literals, i.e. any p or ¬p for p ∈ P, is denoted by Lit. The set of all the propositions is denoted by Props; and each element of Props is referred to by P with or without a subscript. Let us assume that, given
is the set of all the propositions that are the logical consequences of any (pairs of) elements in O. A set of propositions U is said to be consistent iff for any P ∈ Props, if P ∈ U , then ¬P ∈ U ; and if ¬P ∈ U , then P ∈ U . Let us assume that, for any tuples of some sets
Let us further assume that the union of two tuples of sets: Props such that
Assoc is defined to satisfy (1) that if P is a tautology, then Assoc(P ) = (∅, ∅, 0); (2) that if ¬P is tautology, then Assoc(P ) = (Props, Props, 0); and (3) that, if neither;
• Assoc(P1 ∨ P2) consists of all the pairs (Px, Py, n) satisfying the following, otherwise: there exists (Pa, PA, n1) in Assoc(P1) and there exists
, then Py = PA; and (6) Px, Py ∈ Exc(P1 ∧ P2).
• Assoc(¬(P1 ∧ P2)) = Assoc(¬P1 ∨ ¬P2).
• Assoc(¬(P1 ∨ P2)) = Assoc(¬P1 ∧ ¬P2).
We call each P (P 1 , P 2 , n) for some beliefs P, P 1 and P 2 and some n a belief quadruple, and denote the set of belief quadruples by BQuad. We define the set The third condition of the fifth item for disjunction, which says that (P a , P A , n 1 ) in Assoc(P 1 ) and (P b , P B , n 2 ) in Assoc(P 2 ) are not comparable unless both of the P A and P B have the same attributive belief dependency (i.e. n 1 = n 2 ), could be possibly relaxed to be less conservative. We will leave the consideration to a future work.
Belief sets and axioms, and update postulates
In our enriched latent belief theory, a belief base is defined to contain a subset of Props and a set of quadruples: P a (P b , P c , n) where P a , P b , P c ∈ Props and n ∈ N. Additionally, it is defined to contain a table consisting of pairs of 1 In lengthy formal expressions, we use meta-connectives ∧ † , ∨ † , → † , ∀, ∃ in place for conjunction, disjunction, material implication, universal quantification and existential quantification, each following the semantics in classical logic.
(P, Γ) ∈ Props × 2 Props , which records which belief is dependent on what beliefs. Let us denote a set of the pairs by Π with or without a subscript. Let us call some tuple (Γ, ∆, Π) for some Γ ∈ 2
Props \∅, some ∆ ∈ 2 BQuad and some Π a belief base. We denote the set of belief bases by BBase, and refer to each element by B with or without a subscript. A belief set is defined to be an element of BBase that satisfies the following axioms. 1. If P 1 , . . . , P k ∈ B for a finite k, then L({P 1 , . . . , P k }) ⊆ π 1 (B) (Logical closure). 2. If P ∈ π 1 (B), then there is a finite subset X of π 1 (B)
such that P ∈ X. (Compactness). 3. If P ∈ π 1 (B), then for any P 1 , P 2 ∈ Props and any n ∈ N it holds that P (P 1 , P 2 , n) ∈ π 2 (B) (Attributive belief adequacy). 4. If P ∈ π 1 (B), then (P, Γ) ∈ π 3 (B) for some Γ (Support adequacy 1). 5. If P ∈ π 1 (B), then (P, Γ) ∈ π 3 (B) for any Γ (Support adequacy 2). 6. If (P, Γ) ∈ π 3 (B), then Γ = ∅ (Support sanity).
(Support monotonicity). 10. If P is a tautology such that P ∈ π 1 (B), then if (P, Γ) ∈ π 3 (B), then ⊤ ∈ Γ (Tautological support). Compared to the definition of a belief set as found in [2] , this definition does not conduct the fixpoint iterations. For the axioms around the third component of a belief base (the items from 4 to 10), insertion of a couple of notes here may be useful. The (Support adequacy 1), the (Support adequacy 2) and the (Support sanity) ensure that if B is a belief set, then that P is in π 1 (B) means that (P, Γ) for a non-empty Γ ∈ 2 Props is in π 3 (B), and vice versa. The (Disjunctive support propagation) and the (Conjunctive support propagation) say how supporting propositions are determined, deterministically up to L, along the L ladders. The basic functionality of the (Support monotonicity) is to make L(Γ 1 ) = L(Γ 2 ) in case P 1 and P 2 are indistinguishable in L. Finally the (Tautological support) effectively states that a tautological belief in a belief set is independent of any non-tautological beliefs. We say that a belief base B, a belief set in particular, is consistent iff π 1 (B) is consistent.
The following sets of postulates: one for when an item is added to it, as characterised by the operator • B for B ∈ BBase which takes a belief base and a pair of a proposition and a set of propositions to return a belief base; and one for when an item is removed from it, as characterised with the operator − B for B ∈ BBase which takes a belief base and a set of propositions to return a belief base, define rules for updating the support table (which is the third component of a belief base). Support table augmentation operator • satisfies the following.
For each
(P, Γ) ∈ Π1, if (P, Γ x ) ∈ π 3 (B), then (P, Γ x ∪ Γ ∪ {(P1,Γ1)∈Π1 | L(P )⊆L(P1)} Γ 1 ) ∈ π 3 (B • B Π 1 ).
4. If (P, Γ) ∈ π3(B), and if (P1, Γ1) ∈ Π1 for any Γ 1 and
5. π i (B) = π i (B • B Π 1 )) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
6. B • B (P, Γ) satisfies the earlier axioms.
To explain these a little, the fifth postulate ensures that the operation • B acts, if any, only upon π 3 (B), leaving π 1,2 (B) intact. Because of this, whatever changes that • B operation would make to π 3 (B), the sixth postulate guarantees, through the (Support adequacy 1) and the (Support adequacy 2), that 
4. B − B Γ satisfies the earlier axioms except for (Support sanity).
The reduction operation is simpler, trying to remove matching elements off each (P, Γ) ∈ π 3 (B). Then the earlier axioms, in particular the (Support adequacy 1) and the (Support adequacy 2) link the elements to the first component of B.
The reason that we do not include the (Support sanity) in the fourth postulate is just so that we can get the belief contraction operation right in the next section.
Belief change postulates
Let us define that is the belief expansion operator in our belief theory, the belief contraction operator, and ⋆ the belief revision operator. We require each one of them to be a fixpoint iterating process. Since the belief revision operation has been always a derivable operation in the AGM tradition, we only define and ; and, later on, will show how the two operations are combined into ⋆. The graphical representations of B init {P } ⋄ and B init {P } ⋄ , assuming that B init is a belief set, are found in Figure 1 . 2 The
B0 := Binit Figure 1 : Graphical representations of the belief expansion B init {P } ⋄ and the belief contraction B init {P } ⋄ in our latent belief theory. B init is assumed to be a consistent belief set, although the restriction is more a pragmatic than a technical one.
are indeed dropped off, and that we have B 1 ⊂ B 0 (see the graphical representation). Now, it could be that some proposition P x ∈ B 1 may have lost all the propositions for supporting its existence. Then P x can no longer subsist in B 1 , which will be further contracted by all such P x in the next round of the fixpoint iteration.
Explanation: When a belief base is augmented with a new set of beliefs, it could happen that latent beliefs become visible, which is a subset of all the propositions generated by this set construction.
The support table is updated to reflect the loss of beliefs by ÷. Specifically, any element in π 3 (B) is removed if the first component of the element is no longer in π 1 (B). However, recall that the − operation does not satisfy the (Support sanity) axiom. Hence even if the operation should generate some (P, Γ) such that Γ = ∅, it is not removed from the third component.
There is certain difficulty in having an intuitively appealing representation theorem of non-iteratively. In the AGM belief contraction operation, the belief set as a set of propositions, say X, is contracted by some proposition P . No matter how many candidates are for the result of the contraction operation, the candidates are determined by X and P alone with no other non-deterministic factors. However, in our characterisation, the (k + 1)-th fixpoint iteration depends upon the result of the k-th internal contraction by ÷, which can be known non-deterministically. This makes it hard to generate a set-based representation of the contraction operation such that it retain the same intuitive appeal as the AGM representation theorem does. For this reason, we regard the transition systems shown earlier as the representation theorem equivalents for and . By contrast, the internal operations by + and ÷ almost exactly emulate the AGM expansion and contraction operators (Cf. [1] ), and the set-based representation is feasible for each of them without costing intuitive appeal. Particularly for ÷, it goes as follows [1] . Suppose that B is a belief set. Then, π 1 (B) ÷ Γ = (γ(Ξ(π 1 (B), Γ))). Ξ is a mapping from belief sets and propositions into belief sets. For any belief set B and any Γ, we say that a belief set B 1 satisfying
, then there exists some P a ∈ Γ such that P a ∈ π 1 (B 2 ). We define Ξ(π 1 (B), Γ) to be the set of all the subsets of π 1 (B) maximal for Γ. We further define a function γ, so that, if Ξ(π 1 (B), Γ) is not empty, then γ(Ξ (π 1 (B), Γ) ) is a subset of Ξ(π 1 (B), Γ); or if it is empty, it is simply π 1 (B). Then we have that π 1 (B) ÷ Γ = (γ(Ξ (π 1 (B), Γ)) ).
From and , we define the belief revision operator:
And we have the representation in the transition system, as shown in Figure 2 . For the same reason that has hindered us from having a set-based representation of without losing an appeal to intuition, it is difficult to come up with non-iterative postulates for ⋆. This is not the sign that our theory is not robust. It just confirms the point that every belief change operation is an iterative process in our theory. 
Theorem 1 (Preservation
This result can be also adapted to the AGM belief theory, even though there are no quadruples in the AGM setting, so long as the same dependencies among propositions are facilitated in the AGM operations of belief expansion and contraction. With this remark, we are positive that this work has truly offered a satisfactory solution to the recovery paradox as far as the cases similar to the scenarios in the opening examples are concerned.
Conclusion
We have presented an enriched latent belief theory, in which belief dependencies based on how a latent belief has become visible to agents' belief sets can be expressed. We have shown that there is no recovery postulate in our belief theory, thus giving a solution to the recovery paradox that has been in the belief set theories. Our theory indicates that the time may have come to study beyond the Gärdenfors' principle [3] : "If a belief state is revised by a sentence A, then all sentences in K that are independent of the validity of A should be retained in the revised state of belief", upon which many current works on dependencies, such as [6] for a recent one, appear to be based. The examples in Section 1 in any case indicate that beliefs, even though not connected by logical consequences, can still be related by their contents, which is the standpoint that has been already taken in [2] . Although we had to present just the result, there appears to be some observation that has not been detailed in the literature around the recovery paradox. In another work of ours, which is going to be much less technical, we will have an overview of the paradox: what it was, and how it was naturally resolved. One future work will focus on applications of this enriched latent belief theory. Connection to theories of concurrency in computer science will be sought after.
Related works
Several works questioned the AGM recovery postulate [4; 5; 7] . The attempt to amend it has not been successful within the belief set setting, however. There are works on belief revision with non-classical logics that do not have the classical logical consequence relations. Not surprisingly, the recovery property does not necessarily hold in the setting, as evidenced also in the belief base theory, which was cultivated notably by Hansson and others.
